one's act (see Jeffrey, 1983) .
1 Despite the super®cial similarity of the two interpretations, the second, less frequently adopted one holds considerable promise for improving the empirical political analysis of such seemingly intractable issues as turnout in mass elections,`the paradox that ate rational choice theory' (Fiorina, 1990: 334; cf. Aldrich, 1993) . More generally, we will see, it better coheres with the larger aim of developing a scienti®c theory of politics, which should appeal to proponents of positive political theory. It should also have greater appeal to critics of rational choice theory since it offers what might be called a more socialized or less autarkic idea of rationality.
With these advantages, why is this interpretation less popular among those who are aware of both? The bottom line seems to be the allegation that the proposed rationalization of voting in mass elections and other important political behavior implies what is, in fact, individual irrationality. Green and Shapiro (1994: 55) , for example, brie¯y acknowledge the approach developed here, but note that some see it`as the antithesis of rational choice'. Quattrone and Tversky (1988) describe those whose electoral participation re¯ects this approach as suffering from the`voter's illusion'. Seconding Elster's (1985: 366) judgment, Kanazawa (1998: 982) characterizes these agents as engaging in`magical thinking'. Along the same supernatural lines, Skyrms (1996) refers to`voodoo decision theory'. This article will explain why these judgments are incorrect. Agents who maximize their conditional expected utility are normatively rational. The article will also develop some of the implications of this approach for political behavior and show that some important and recognized work in political science has unwittingly already embraced its underlying assumptions.
For those familiar with my earlier analysis of conditional expected utility theory (Grafstein, 1999) , I should note three important ways in which the present contribution represents added value. One, it reorganizes the argument for conditional expected utility theory to confront objections that have surfaced in print and otherwise since the publication of the book. Similarly, it compares the theory to a new alternative rational choice explanation of turnout (Schuessler, 2000) . Most important, my earlier work among other things merely applies this theory game theoretically. The present article's connection to game theory is deeper. It discusses conditional expected utility theory's role in providing a foundation for the fundamental concept of a Nash equilibrium. 140 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(2)
I
In order to appreciate the ambiguous role of expectations in the standard de®nition of rationality, it is necessary to de®ne expected utility carefully. According to Ordeshook (1986: 40) , rational actors behave as if they choose the action maximizing uq X o j P O q j uo j 1 where u( . ) is a utility function, that is, a numerical representation of an individual's preferences; and q is a lottery, which is to say, a list of probabilities q 1 ; F F F ; q j ; F F F ; q n associated respectively with the alternative outcomes O fo 1 ; F F F ; o j ; F F F ; o n g in which the agent is interested. Thus (1) states that the expected utility of the lottery q is determined by multiplying the utility of each possible outcome by its probability of occurring and summing over these alternative outcomes.
To illustrate with a famous example (Downs, 1957) , consider an agent deciding whether to vote in a mass election.
2 Excluding the possibility of a tie for simplicity, the election has two possible outcomes, o 1 , the preferred candidate wins, which we will assume has a utility of 10,000 for the agent, and o 2 , the opponent wins, which is assumed to have a utility of 0. When the agent votes, these outcomes occur with probabilities q 1 and q 2 1 À q 1 respectively, so1 ; q 2 . This agent's expected utility from voting is therefore: q 1 Â 10;000 À 10 1 À q 1 Â À10 10;000q 1 À 10, where the utility cost of voting is assumed to be 10. The expected utility of participation, however, must be compared to the expected utility of the alternative, abstention. But since the chance of a single vote's changing the outcome in a mass election is negligible (e.g. Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1981; Owen and Grofman, 1984; Fischer, 1999) , the probability of victory for the preferred candidate when the agent abstains is nearly q 1 . Therefore, abstention generates a new lottery q H % q, and the parallel calculation yields an expected utility from abstaining of approximately q 1 Â 10;000 1 À q 1 Â 0 10;000q 1 . Despite the large stake involved relative to the cost of voting, uq H > uq: it is rational to abstain, which evidently means that millions of voters can be wrong so long as they decide instrumentally. Now consider a reformulation of (1) in terms of conditional expectation. The rational agent chooses the act a q that maximizes
where proo j ja q denotes the probability of outcome o j given the act a q and everything else is as before. Under this interpretation rational agents maximize their conditional expected utility, that is, their utility conditional on their acts. In the case of voting, the act a q is either participation or abstention. At ®rst sight, only a difference in notation separates (1) and (2). After all, which lottery the agent faces in the voting illustration of (1), q or q H , is determined by which act, voting or abstaining, the agent chooses. Hence even though (1) does not explicitly say so, it would seem that q 1 is in fact the probability of the preferred candidate's victory conditional on the agent's decision to vote. If this is the case, (2) simply makes explicit what (1) implies.
Yet this reconciliation of (1) and (2) overlooks two crucial assumptions also implicit in (1) and on which Ordeshook's (1986: 10±11 and 49±50) speci®c development of the calculus of voting relies. A complete elaboration of expected utility theory would make these assumptions clear (e.g. Savage, 1954) .
Implicit in (1) is, ®rst, the assumption that each state of the world that combines with an act to determine an outcome ± in the voting case, the number of votes the two candidates receive from the other voters ± is causally independent of the decision maker's choice. In the voting case, for example, it is assumed that a decision maker's individual vote, or abstention, does not in¯uence the decisions of others. Their votes are ®xed and determined independently of the decision maker's own behavior. Here this assumption only does minor violence to reality, but accommodating it in some decision situations requires, as we will see later, complex de®nitions of the relevant states of the world (see Joyce, 1999) . The use of (2) has the pragmatic advantage of not needing this assumption.
Second, in Ordeshook (1986: 2) , the author states that the`assumption of purposeful action dictates . . . that we specify the . . . outcomes that people seek to bring about or to avoid by their actions'. As his analysis of the turnout decision shows, this means that the probabilities ®guring in (1) should measure the likelihood that a given act like voting will cause a particular outcome, like a particular candidate's election, to occur. Ordeshook therefore de®nes the relevant outcomes in the voting example not, strictly speaking, in terms of whether the preferred candidate does or does not win but in terms of whether the candidate wins or loses by one vote, more than one vote, or ties.
Again, the formulation embodied in (2) imposes no such restriction. The outcomes o 1 and o 2 are exactly as described earlier, either the preferred candidate wins or the opponent wins, and the probabilities at issue are the probabilities that these events occur given the agent's action. Thus suppose that, due to some combination of party, class, gender or ethnic identi®cation, the decision maker believes, correctly, that the probability that other supporters of her/his preferred candidate will vote given her/his own participation is substantially greater than this probability given her/his abstention. In other words, prob(preferred candidate wins jparticipation) ) prob(preferred candidate wins j abstention). Voting is then instrumentally rational as de®ned by (2). Millions of voters may be correct.
Faced with the turnout paradox haunting the standard de®nition of rationality, Downs (1957) infers that voters must derive a consumption bene®t from voting, say, satisfaction from performing their civic duty (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) . Recently, Schuessler (2000) has ingeniously expanded this explanation. Voting, he claims, has both an instrumental component, calculated in the usual way, and an expressive component representing the utility voters receive from using their votes to express who they are, say, Democrat or Republican. The expressive component, Schuessler argues, explains turnout when instrumental considerations fail. It also helps account for other interesting voting-related phenomena such as bandwagon effects.
The usual complaint against a`consumption bene®t' explanation of voting is that its easy availability makes it empirically weak. Indeed, this explanation threatens to become tautological (Barry, 1970) . However, the theory of expressive voting, Schuessler (2000: 43) responds, is not guilty of adding an inert consumption bene®t to a more fundamental instrumental decision. Rather, the theory introduces what might be called an active decision element into the voter's instrumental calculus insofar as his decision depends on what speci®cally his vote expresses. 3 The fact that this theory necessitates a fullscale interpretation of the act of voting, Schuessler argues, is a point in favor of his approach.
To my mind, the comparative advantage of conditional expected utility theory's account of turnout is its relative parsimony. The voting decision remains completely instrumental (which is to be distinguished from causal) and the theorist's interpretive burdens are minimized. With regard to the latter advantage, conditional expected utility theory's explanation of behavior is grounded in a simple belief-desire psychology. Beliefs are entirely captured by a probability distribution and preferences are understood to be expressed behaviorally. 4 Consider, however, an example of what a more traditional interpretive approach entails. Acknowledging the instrumental character of the typical voter's own explanation for voting, Schuessler (2000: 26) is forced to distinguish the instrumental`idiom' of the voter's response and the true expressive meaning of his or her actions. Voters vote to say who they are, but evidently are reluctant to say so when questioned by survey researchers. Or perhaps these very publicly expressed motivations are hidden from them. Conditional expected utility theory, by contrast, does not return to the complexities and ambiguities of Verstehen. Indeed the theory tries to stay at arm's length from the speci®c mental processes of the concrete decision maker, a point I elaborate in section IV.
II
Ultimately, of course, the turnout problem is game theoretic. As Downs (1957: 267) noticed and Ledyard (1984) explained, the probability of a potential vote's being decisive (or the probability of a candidate's victory given this vote) is not exogenous. Rather, the relevant probability is determined by the parallel turnout decisions made by the other potential voters. This insight, however, in no way obviates our simpler decision-theoretic approach. It is clear that the adequacy of the decision-theoretic explanation of turnout is a necessary condition for the adequacy of a game-theoretic analysis of turnout using conditional expected utility theory (e.g. Grafstein, 1991) . 5 The latter simply introduces conditional expected utility maximization into a framework in which all potential voters perform parallel calculations.
In fact, this version of decision theory may provide a needed foundation for game theory generally. One problem facing standard game theory, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) observe, is that typically it shows only that game equilibria are maintained if, by some chance, they arise. It does not explain how they arise from the individual calculations of rational players. In other words, the existence of a Nash equilibrium relies on the 144 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) 4. In fairness, Davidson (1980: 268±75) argues strongly that while choice behavior is a vector of belief and preference, there is no unique way to decompose it into these two components. Yet he does adduce additional constraints on interpretation.
5. Fischer (1999) offers pragmatic arguments for the use of decision theory. Note also that my proof of positive turnout in game-theoretic situations (Grafstein, 1991) blocks Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) result for the standard model that while turnout in equilibrium is strictly positive for instrumentally rational voters, it limits to zero as the size of the electorate increases. mutual consistency in equilibrium of the`conjecture' each player makes about the strategies of the other players. It does not, in general, explain why players ®nd themselves choosing the particular combination of strategies supporting those mutually consistent conjectures. When there is a Nash equilibrium, no one has an incentive to deviate from the behavior supporting it. But why that behavior in the ®rst place, ask Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) ?
Note, by the way, that the solution to this particular problem does not lie with evolutionary game theory or the theory of moves (Brams, 1994) . However valuable, the former explains equilibria by stepping outside of standard game theory: players who are not fully rational, perhaps behaving adaptively, back into (local) equilibria. For its part, the theory of moves embeds the Nash equilibrium in a dynamic framework, indicating the possibility of new and interesting outcomes. But once again, this merely shows that if players ®nd themselves in these new equilibrium situations, they will stay.
In order to motivate Nash equilibria, Aumann and Brandenburger argue, it is necessary to appreciate that the individuals making the relevant calculations are part of the world in which they act. A game and the decision makers acting within it are connected because each player's act is part of the gametheoretic state of the world in terms of which that player forms beliefs and selects strategies.
Yet treating the player's act as part of the state of the world is the hallmark of conditional expected utility theory's formal technology (Jeffrey, 1983) . For this reason, conditional expected utility theory and Aumann and Brandenburger's search for decision-theoretic foundations for game theory converge. Both abandon expected utility theory's assumption I, which requires each state of the world to be causally independent of the individual's decision.`While convenient in [a] one-person context, this is not appropriate in the interactive, many-person world. . . . Also the plain, everyday meaning of the term``state of the world'' includes one's actions: Our world is shaped by what we do' Brandenburger, 1995: 1174) . Causal dependence, of course, implies stochastic dependence.
For our purposes, then, viewing the player's act as part of the state of the world has one fundamental consequence. Stochastic dependence between the player's act and that state is now seen to be central to modeling the structural interdependence characteristic of games. For insofar as the player is assumed to make use of all available information when inferring what state of the world he is in, he will exploit any stochastic dependencies between his act and the acts of others:`The assumption of [stochastic] independence, which is normally accepted without discussion in non-cooperative game theory, in fact becomes quite questionable once the decision-theoretic viewpoint is adopted' (Brandenburger, 1992: 89 ; also see Aumann, 1987: 16±17) . 6 If a decision maker's act is an element of the state of the world and she is presumed to know her own act, then her assessment of what is rational to do will be conditioned on that knowledge. The reader may therefore wonder whether Aumann and Brandenburger would be willing to take the idea of stochastic dependence to its logical conclusion by rationalizing voting in the participation game. After all, a thoroughgoing stochastic dependence does not allow a player to conclude that since her voting implies voting by fellow partisans, she should free ride on this predicted turnout and abstain. Free-riding would still be a mistake. Her new act's stochastic dependence with the acts of others in that new state of the world would make abstention unattractive since it would indicate increased abstention. If she`wishes to do something else . . . then the state is different' Brandenburger, 1995: 1174) . Thus the spirit of their analysis suggests that free-riding does not work if the stochastic dependence between like-minded players is high enough.
Unfortunately, in the actual development of their approach Aumann and Brandenburger blink before its radical implications, in effect disregarding their observation that a change of act necessarily implies a change in the state of the world. Speci®cally, they de®ne a rational act r as one having a higher expected utility in the state of the world encompassing r than any other act given the state of the world associated not with that other act but with r. As a result, their technical de®nition of rationality does not in fact recognize that when the act changes`then the state is different'. In this sense, they remain loyal to the standard analysis. In the Appendix I more formally contrast Aumann and Brandenburger's approach and the approach taken here. Readers interested in game solutions from the perspective of conditional expected utility theory may ®nd that section useful.
Empirically, at any rate, Aumann and Brandenburger would have been better served to accept the full implications of conditional expected utility theory. For the hypothesis that stochastic dependencies in¯uence decisions has received substantial empirical support. Their use constitutes the`voters' illusion' that, according to Quattrone and Tversky (1988) explains the voting participation of the subjects they studied. Similarly, cognitive psychologists 146 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) 6. The structure of a static game prevents one player's action from causing other players to behave differently. But causal independence does not imply stochastic independence, which is in doubt once the decision maker is part of the state of the world. This is worth stressing given, e.g. Bernheim's (1984 Bernheim's ( : 1014 claim that in a purely non-cooperative setting a correlation between players' choices is`nonsensical: the choices of any two agents are by de®nition independent events; they cannot affect each other '. have amply documented a`consensus effect' (e.g. Fiske and Taylor, 1984: 82±3; Dawes, 1990) in which individuals rely on their own characteristics (here taken to include behavior) as a basis for judging the characteristics of others. Experimental research documents the role of group identity in encouraging cooperation (e.g. Orbell et al., 1988) . Indeed placing in context their experimental results, Orbell et al. (1991: 123) observe,`One of the most replicated ®ndings from social dilemma experimental research is of a strong positive correlation between expectations of others' cooperation and one's own cooperation', where the`expectations often occur subsequent to one's own choice' (emphasis in the original). Moreover, Skyrms (1996: 61) , who we have seen is no fan of conditional expected utility maximization as a norm of rationality, judges it to be an essential element in the explanation of human and nonhuman cooperation:`The crucial step in modifying evolutionary game theory to take account of correlations is just to calculate expected ®tness according to Jeffrey's (1983) The Logic of Decision rather than Savage's The Foundation of Statistics' (see also Morikawa et al., 1995) .
Skyrms's empirical use of these correlations, of course, is perfectly consistent with his rejection of conditional expected utility theory on normative, causal grounds. But this consistency cuts both ways. The correlations embodied in conditional expected utility calculations are no less informative ± no less true ± for being non-causal. It is important to keep this in mind when assessing Kanazawa's (2000: 436) conclusion that`Grafstein's voters therefore perceive an illusory correlation between their present behavior (voting versus abstention in the current election) and the simultaneous behavior of other voters (their voting or abstention)' (emphasis in the original). True, the statistical dependencies motivating these voters are not rooted in causal relations. Yet they are not illusory in the sense of being contrary to fact.
7 Illusory statistical dependencies cannot provide useful information, those involved in maximizing conditional expected utility do. And when using them, Grafstein's voters know their behavior has no magical powers.
Finally, the contingent character of decisions made according to conditional expected utility theory is another important empirical feature deserving emphasis. The standard analysis of electoral participation and related decision problems seriously under-predicts`cooperative' behavior in both real world and laboratory settings. By the same token, analyses that somehow claim that cooperation is the unique rational choice in such situations GRAFSTEIN: RATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS 147 7. Spurious correlations dissolve when other factors are considered. By contrast, the conditional dependencies discussed here already incorporate all the agent's information. Furthermore, if one believes in causation in some metaphysical sense that is offended by conditional expected utility theory, then presumably even the correlations remaining after all known controls are introduced could, in principle, be non-causal.
(e.g. Rapoport, 1966: 141±2) in effect greatly over-predict turnout (charitable contributions, respect for the environment, etc.). In contrast to both of these, conditional expected utility theory predicts cooperative behavior or its opposite depending on the speci®c stochastic dependencies in operation relative to the stakes involved. It comes to the reasonable conclusion, grounded in experimental and quasi-experimental research as well as casual observation, that cooperative behavior in mass political settings is common but far from uniform.
III
Findings that subjects do not reason by way of expected utility maximization are legion but they have not changed many convictions about the proper de®-nition of rationality. So the ®nding that subjects systematically ignore the distinction between those statistical dependencies that correspond to causal relations and those that do not is no more troubling, perhaps, than the discovery that students in introductory methodology courses initially fall for spurious correlations. According to its critics, then, the conditional expected utility approach, which ostensibly rationalizes voting in mass elections, rests in fact on an elementary confusion between causation and correlation.
The claim that true rationality rides on the distinction between causal relations and spurious statistical relations, however, misses the point of what rational decision making under risk involves. To boil the issue down to essentials, consider a procedure for choosing between two candidates in which the name of the voter's preferred candidate is written on a piece of paper and placed in one of two opaque boxes according to the determination of a random device that picks box 1 with a .98 probability and box 2 with a .02 probability.
8 If the voter chooses the box with the preferred candidate's name in it, that candidate wins; if not, the opponent wins. A victory by the preferred candidate is again worth 10,000 utils more than a victory by the opponent, but the choice of box 1 carries a surcharge of 10 utils. Which box is rational to pick?
It depends on the de®nition of rationality. For note an important but seemingly innocuous feature of the problem. The insertion of the randomly selected piece of paper occurs prior to the voter's decision. This feature ensures not only that assumption I is satis®ed, since which box contains the paper is causally independent of the voter's decision. It also ensures with regard to assumption II that there is no ambiguity about the status of the probabilities in the problem. Since the paper is already in a box, which box contains the paper is ®xed and determined, just like the votes of other voters in actual elections. There is nothing the decision maker can do to cause the paper to be in the chosen box. Thus the probabilities at issue ± .98 for box 1 and .02 for box 2 ± are purely subjective in the sense that there is no objective uncertainty about where the paper is.
9
What the prior insertion of the paper does, then, is to make clear that (1) the probabilities in this example are analogous to those the conditional expected utility approach to turnout takes seriously and the expected utility approach does not; (2) picking box 1 is analogous to voting; and (3) picking box 2 is analogous to abstaining. The example thereby incorporates our assumption that a potential voter has appropriate beliefs about the probability of the preferred candidate's winning conditional on voting (i.e. picking box 1) and the (lower) probability conditional on abstaining (i.e. picking box 2). The example also incorporates our assumption that these beliefs do not re¯ect the causal impact of his single vote. Of course, the fact that the probabilities are extreme compared to the dependencies found in real life does not change the logic of the situation. Nor is the logic changed by the absence of a third box allowing a vote for the candidate the voter does not prefer. This third box would represent a dominated and therefore irrelevant alternative.
To clarify why the probabilities now correspond to those associated with conditional expected utility maximization, observe that the typical critic of this approach to voting does not question the existence of statistical dependencies involving gender, race, ethnicity, party identi®cation, and the like. These dependencies are well documented. The criticism is simply that valid though they may be, they should not be factored into a rational voter's decision since that decision cannot cause a shift in the behavior of those voters to whom the statistical dependencies apply. Similarly, in the more contrived example under consideration now, the (subjective) probabilities remain appropriate, but the location of the paper cannot be affected by the decision maker's choice of a box. Therefore, since the selection of box 1 costs 10 utils whereas the selection of box 2 does not, an expected utility maximizer apparently should choose box 2. The conditional expected utility maximizer has no such qualms about noncausal statistical dependencies and opts for box 1.
Clearly, the conditional expected utility maximizer is correct and the expected utility maximizer is not. Is there is a way to redeem expected utility theory so that it too implies the choice of box 1? There is. The probabilities GRAFSTEIN: RATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS 149 9. Fischer (1999) argues strongly that for expected utility maximizers only subjective probability is relevant in calculating the probability of being decisive, the objective probability being 0 or 1. used in this theory's interpretation of the actual voting case re¯ect the negligible chance that the voter will break a tie, that is, cause the preferred candidate to win. In our contrived example, this restriction is in fact stronger. The decision maker cannot cause the winning paper to be in the chosen box even probabilistically. The paper is already there or not. Suppose, then, that causally connected probabilities are reintroduced into the choice of boxes by reformulating the causal relation. The decision maker is no longer considered to be causing the winning paper to be in the chosen box, an in¯uence with 0 probability. But by picking box 1 the decision maker is considered to be causing with probability .98 the box containing the paper to be chosen. Under this reinterpretation the expected utility maximizer can choose box 1.
Needless to say, the distinction between causing with high probability that the paper is in the box and causing with high probability that the box with the paper is chosen seems very arti®cial. Yet as the preceding discussion of assumption I already indicated, maintaining expected utility theory's requirement of causal independence in a way that makes the theory's recommendations correct often involves arti®cial constructions. Moreover, in quite parallel situations this reinterpretation has been suggested by those applying expected utility theory (cf. Brams, 1976: 200±3, citing John Ferejohn; Lewis, 1983) .
At any rate, let us assume this reinterpretation. Actual expected utility theorists confronted with this example would doubtless recommend box 1 from the start and, if pressed, rationalize their advice in the manner just indicated. Yet there is one overwhelming problem with this choice and its justi®cation. It represents a Pyrrhic victory. For when this solution is applied to the original turnout paradox, it legitimates using the broader probabilities conditional expected utility theory recognizes. Under this reinterpretation, in other words, expected utility theory no longer demands that the individual's vote cause with suf®ciently high probability the preferred candidate's victory. Instead, it merely requires that with suf®ciently high probability the winning candidate be the one the decision maker votes for. If the statistical dependency between this agent's decision and the decisions of other supporters is high enough, this requirement is satis®ed. In sum, the reinterpretation saves expected utility theory. However, it does so by resolving the ambiguity surrounding expectations in the turnout paradox in favor of conditional expected utility theory. Expected utility theorists, as a result, would reach the same conclusions about turnout as those reached by conditional expected utility theorists.
Thus, if expected utility theorists recommend box 2, they make a clear mistake but their principles of choice remain consistent with the Downsian analysis of turnout. If they join conditional expected utility theorists in recommending box 1, they give the correct advice but their principles of choice are then inconsistent with the Downsian analysis. It is expected utility 150 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) theory's sharp segregation of causal and`spurious' statistical relations that generates the real confusion.
IV
Students of voting typically use re®ned demographic categorizations of the voting age population in order to predict aggregate behavior. Thus knowledge that African American voters will have a higher than average turnout in a particular US presidential election would certainly affect predictions concerning the Democratic candidate's chances. What then is wrong when an individual deciding whether to vote exploits these same demographic patterns? Nothing, according to conditional expected utility theory. If conditional expected utility maximizers believe there is a suf®ciently high likelihood that groups of their fellow partisans will vote given their own participation, they will turn out to vote. This answer, of course, relies on an analogy between the individual decision maker and the political scienti®c observer. Yet this analogy seems quite strong. For one can think of political scientists analyzing voting behavior as (conditional) expected utility maximizers, an interpretation consistent with the view of statistical analysis incorporated in Bayesian statistics (e.g. DeGroot, 1970) . According to this Bayesian interpretation, the political scientist acts precisely as a decision maker when using demographic information about others in order to predict their aggregate behavior more accurately (utility here being a positive function of accuracy).
One might object that once citizens believe with high probability that others will vote, they will free ride on this predicted participation and stay home. We have already noted one answer to this objection: statistical facts are still facts. If these conditional probabilities are accurate, then the decision of others to abstain will also be relatively high given the individual decision maker's (revised) decision to abstain. Staying home cannot negate an individual's social or political identity.
10 Put another way, the conditional probabilities statistically linking the individual's behavior to the behavior of others shadow the individual whether voting or abstaining.
Yet by raising the possibility of free-riding, the preceding objection is perhaps registering a deeper complaint about the analogy between predictions made by scienti®c observers and predictions made by individual participants. One might argue that there is a fundamental difference between statistical regularities governing aggregates and statistical regularities purporting to GRAFSTEIN: RATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS 151
10. The motivation for sidestepping complicated issues relating to the dynamics of deliberation (see, e.g., Jeffrey, 1983; Skyrms, 1990) will be developed later. determine the individual's own relation to those aggregates. The individual decision maker deciding whether to vote uses demographic information about his own behavior, not just information about the behavior of others. The former use is illegitimate, this objection goes, because it treats a statistical fact linking the behavior of demographic group members as a ®xed fact implicating the agent's own decision. However, this decision is the agent's to make, not the statistic's. Statistical demographic information can guide the individual agent's calculation of the ex ante likelihood that others will turn out. It cannot supplant the individual's own choice between two feasible alternatives, voting and abstaining.
This objection seems quite reasonable until one recognizes what it entails. Consider a (science ®ction) world in which the supporters of a particular candidate, who outnumber supporters of the opponent, are so similar that the relevant statistical dependencies are perfect: fellow partisans will vote with certainty if the agent votes, will abstain with certainty if the agent abstains. In effect, it would appear that under these extreme circumstances the agent's alternatives have been reduced to two: vote and elect the preferred candidate or abstain and witness the defeat of the preferred candidate. But according to the distinction between individual and aggregate probabilities just raised, even these statistical facts should not affect the rational agent's decision. The agent's free choice should rise above the statistical facts so to speak and lead him to decide against voting.
11 After all, whether other partisans vote or not is still ®xed and determined, causally independent of the agent's vote. Thus the expected utility maximizer will behave in a way that would prompt other expected utility maximizers observing his behavior to bet against his preferred candidate given any odds (risk aversion does not matter when there is no risk to avert). Conditional expected utility maximizers, by contrast, will be consistent in betting on victory as both observers and participants.
The virtue of this example, of course, is not its realism. Rather, it serves to test support for expected utility theory in the extreme case in which the relevant probabilities are all probability 1. In other words, no one is suggesting that actual voters are or should be modeled as behavioral clones. Yet 152 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14 (2) 11. See, for example, Gibbard and Harper (1978) and Harper (1993) . Conversely, note that although conditional probabilities are a two-way street ± the other voters' behavior predicts the agent's ± this does not affect her/his calculations, which condition on his own behavior. As discussed in the text, the two-way street may, however, have deep implications for the metaphysical freedom of this particular voter (see Jeffrey, 1993; Levi, 1997) . It is also worth observing that the debate between Binmore (1996) and Aumann (1996) over the logic of backward induction in game theory revolves, in part, around Aumann's argument that since knowledge that x implies that the probability that x is unity, common knowledge of rationality allows players to exclude the possibility of irrational behavior occurring a priori. certainty is still a probability and one that starkly clari®es the kinds of choices to which the strict expected utility maximizer is committed. It may also be worth emphasizing that the decision maker cannot say, in effect, that since I now know that all my fellow clones will be voting, I can stay home. This knowledge of their behavior is conditional on the decision maker's own act of participation. The decision maker who stays home is just as sure that those fellow clones will be abstaining. And again, this inference does not require mental telepathy or mysterious causal powers. The decision maker is simply doing the best she can with all the information she has, including the information provided by her own behavior.
Conditional expected utility theory postulates agents who maximize their expected utility given whatever credible information they derive from whatever source. Expected utility theory postulates agents who maximize their expected utility given whatever credible information they have except information derived from their own contemporaneous behavior. Expected utility theory bases this exception on a notion of free choice or free will that evidently must be operationally important in explaining individual behavior. This certainly seems to be the implication of the judgment of one recognized expert on statistical inference:`To regard [a choice] as free is exactly to regard it as without the evidential relevance it would have if it were regarded, not as an act, but as a bit of behavior' (Kyburg, 1988: 80 ; emphasis in the original). Apparently, this distinction between behavior and acts arises because agents' free will allows them to act outside the statistical facts in which their behavior is embedded. Otherwise, how do expected utility maximizers ignore the statistical implications of their own behavior?
It needs to be stressed, then, that the complications entailed in considering clone-like behavior, as with the complications surrounding the two-box example, are created by expected utility theory's failure to incorporate expectations and information in a natural and undifferentiated way. These complications result from the expected utility theorist's insistence that there is a very deep distinction between the actions implied by the third-person calculations of political scientists and the actions implied by the ®rst-person calculations of ordinary decision makers. Expected utility theory is a scienti®c approach that assumes the subjects of its analysis can systematically defy the facts science discovers about their behavior.
Granted, from the ®rst-person perspective of the decision maker, choice seen from the`inside' does appear to transcend statistical dependence and demographic regularities. However, it would be ironic in the extreme if defenders of expected utility theory appealed to the wisdom of introspection. They continue to defend their own position against similar appeals by reminding critics in political science that the issue is simply whether agents behave as if they are rational and that therefore such appeals are irrelevant (e.g. Ordeshook, 1986: 2) . In this same spirit, conditional expected utility theory characterizes the behavior of rational agents, rather than attempting to say how it looks to them from the inside or how they might or should psychologically reason their way to an individual decision. Simply put, rational decision makers are distinguished by this prediction: when we chart the possible worlds in which they might ®nd themselves, they are more likely, crudely speaking, to be found in higher-utility worlds. Brandenburger's (1995: 1174±5) 
V
Positive political theorists widely support expected utility theory's analysis of voting. Still, is it possible that their intuitions supporting expected utility theory weaken when they analyze situations outside the electoral setting? In fact, Tsebelis ' (1990) widely cited analysis of European parliamentary systems seems to rely implicitly on assumptions consistent with conditional expected utility theory.
Tsebelis' goal is to explain how these institutional arrangements were created in the context of a non-cooperative game in which binding coalitions or contracts are not possible. He models participants as playing a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in which, as is well known, the dominant equilibrium strategy for both players is not to cooperate. To show how cooperation can develop nonetheless, Tsebelis (1990: 68±72) invokes the idea of correlated strategies.
A correlated strategy is`a random variable whose values are n-tuples of actions' (Aumann, 1987: 3;  here n 2). More concretely, the strategies of players are made contingent on the shared observation of a random event like the throw of dice. When players use this mechanism, their strategies need not be statistically independent. As a result, players can choose to correlate their strategies, which gives them strategic possibilities otherwise unavailable to them.
Speci®cally, cooperation from one player in the Prisoner's Dilemma can become positively correlated with cooperation from the other, which according to Tsebelis (1990: 68) produces a statistical form of contingency:
when contingent or correlated strategies are introduced . . . cooperation can develop in a prisoners' dilemma game. . . . Let us consider the following situation: two players play the prisoners' dilemma game; when the ®rst (the row player) chooses to cooperate, the second chooses to cooperate with probability p. . . . Moreover, assume that once the row player chooses to defect, the column player chooses to defect as well with probability q.
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JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(2) It is important to emphasize that for Tsebelis this particular form of contingency is for static games, for as he observes,`players can develop contingent strategies if they can communicate, if they can write down contracts, or if they can enter into repeated interaction ' (1990: 69; emphasis added) . Thus in addition to his direct citation of Aumann's work, this quotation (plus the fact that Tsebelis devotes a separate section to repeated games) gives strong reason to believe that the correlated strategies he is discussing are those introduced by Aumann for one-shot games. If, alternatively, he appealed to binding contracts or binding commitments as the basis for cooperation he would at best trivialize his solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Rather, in this static setting it is clear that there is one key to his`rational account of the choice of cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game: incomplete information' (Tsebelis, 1990: 103) .
The next question, therefore, is whether the option of correlated strategies allows players to resolve the Prisoner's Dilemma. Aumann (1987: 4) de®nes a correlated equilibrium in terms of a random variable f such that each player's expected payoff from f is at least as large as the expected payoff from any alternative collection of correlated strategies in which that player chooses some other strategy and the remaining players continue to play according to f.`Equilibrium is achieved when no player can gain by deviating from the suggestions [represented by f ], given that the others obey them. ' One correlated strategy in the Prisoner's Dilemma has both players using a fair coin in the following way: with probability .5 one player cooperates and the other defects and with probability .5 they reverse roles. It can be shown that when the relative rewards to individual defection are high enough, this strategy maximizes both players' payoffs. For in this case each player prefers the equally probable prospect of one player defecting against the other over the alternative (degenerate) correlated strategy of mutual cooperation (i.e. cooperate if the coin comes up heads, cooperate if the coin comes up tails).
Yet neither correlated strategy, as Aumann (1987: 4) shows, is a correlated equilibrium.`Indeed, in the prisoner's dilemma, it is always worthwhile for Player 1 to play bottom [i.e., defect]' (emphasis in the original). Tsebelis, however, believes contingent strategies can solve the Prisoner's Dilemma. To see this, note that in his setup EUhefet T1 À q Pq EUgooperte Rp S1 À p where EU denotes expected utility, p and q are de®ned as before, T is the payoff to a player who unilaterally defects, P is the payoff from mutual defection, R is the payoff from mutual cooperation and S is the payoff from unilateral cooperation. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, T > R > P > S. Thus, GRAFSTEIN: RATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS 155
Tsebelis concludes, cooperation is rational in the Prisoner's Dilemma if EUgooperte > EUhefet. It is easy to show by algebraic manipulation that this occurs when
that is, when p and q are suf®ciently high. In words, to the extent the correlation encompassing mutual defection and the correlation encompassing mutual cooperation are both high, cooperation is individually rational. In fact, for any values of the payoffs satisfying the strict payoff inequalities, there are p and q that rationalize cooperation: when p q 1, (3) reduces to R À P > 0, which is true by construction. The discrepancy between Aumann's mathematically correct conclusion that the Prisoner's Dilemma remains a dilemma and Tsebelis' more optimistic result can be explained by their different interpretations of feasible strategies. In Tsebelis's analysis, evidently, players cannot choose to accept or not accept the recommendations embodied in p and q. But this means that p and q must be facts about the players that they can exploit but from which they cannot unilaterally deviate. In the games Aumann analyzes, an individual's defection always destroys the cooperative correlated equilibria Tsebelis identi®es. In the games Tsebelis analyzes, individual defection does not make sense when it brings with it a suf®ciently high probability of defection by the other player.
It is worth emphasizing that in this context Tsebelis is analyzing noncooperative rather than cooperative games. For a binding contract in a static game would not have the probabilistic effects he charts. In cooperative games, Tsebelis notes, players' binding agreements imply either mutual cooperation or, in the event of a violation, mutual defection. In such a case, p q 1. Clearly these extreme values are not the focus of Tsebelis' analysis since, as we saw, they would make (3) unnecessary, reducing it to the truism R À P > 0.
By the same token, Tsebelis (1990: 83) says that he is not interested in the pure independence associated with noncooperative games in their standard form since then`each player determines his or her course of action independent of the other'. But Tsebelis characterizes this independence as follows. Statistical independence is de®ned as the case in which the conditional probability of cooperation (when the other cooperates) is equal to the unconditional probability of cooperation ' (p. 81) .
This notion of independence has crucial implications for the debate between expected versus conditional expected utility theory. As we saw before, the idea of independence anchoring expected utility theory's version of non-cooperative game theory is causal, not statistical. As we saw in the case of clone-like voting behavior, in particular, the conditional probabilities 156 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(2) can even equal 1 consistent with this theory's approach to independence in non-cooperative games. In effect, Tsebelis is challenging expected utility theory's refusal to use these statistical facts about the players to make predictions about their behavior. They are not a matter of mutual choice. There is a ®nal bit of evidence that Tsebelis is thinking of statistical dependence in terms of facts, not choices. He infers from (3) that different sets of payoff values are consistent with different degrees of correlation. In other words, some payoff values support many more combinations of p and q than others. Although observers are likely to have information about the distribution of p and q in a particular setting, the relative likelihood of cooperation can, in general, be determined from the payoff values (p. 84).
However plausible, this reasoning only makes sense when the statistical dependencies p and q are regarded as behavioral facts. For if the players choose or at least agree to p and q, as Aumann assumes, their statistical distribution is irrelevant. All that could be inferred from (3) is that values satisfying the inequality are suf®cient to lead to a correlated equilibrium, assuming the participants can devise an appropriate randomizing device. On the other hand if, as Tsebelis' argument implies, p and q are facts about players, not choices of players, then the distribution of p and q ± the likelihood of the appropriate facts obtaining ± becomes an entirely relevant empirical consideration and his argument seems to be correct.
All of this is not to say that conditional expected utility theory consciously or unconsciously motivates Tsebelis' analysis. Instead, it suggests that this theory's use of probabilities to understand the way interdependence imposes constraints on the calculations of rational players may be more intuitively plausible than is generally acknowledged. The theory is not as foreign to ordinary intuition as one might infer from typical discussions of the turnout paradox. This in itself does not make conditional expected utility theory valid. It does say that if this theory turns out to be innocent of logical or theoretical¯aws it may be hard to dismiss it as plainly counterintuitive.
VI
Debates over the proper de®nition of rational political behavior and, in particular, debates over the appropriate analysis of voting in mass elections will not be settled by weighing the competing intuitions of scholars. Ultimately these debates must be resolved by comparing the explanatory power of the different accounts of rationality. Yet such comparisons are biased, if not thwarted, when one side disputes the competing de®nition's status as a de®nition. The purpose of this article has not been to establish conditional expected utility theory by a priori reasoning, but to level the GRAFSTEIN: RATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS 157 playing ®eld when it is put alongside its more prominent rival, expected utility theory. The latter faces serious empirical problems. This article has suggested reasons to think that conditional expected utility theory may solve at least some of these problems. Moreover, if the present article is correct, critics can no longer deny the cogency of these solutions simply by rehashing the common complaint that to make sense the theory must secretly assume that an individual's decision magically in¯uences the behavior of others. To repeat, the theory does not assume that conditional expected utility maximizers believe they cause behavior by others. At the very least, then, critics must now expose the mistakes in this article's detailed arguments and examples designed to show that causation is not in fact a necessary crutch. Their counter-argument requires more than restating the point at issue.
Actually, conditional expected utility theory's treatment of political behavior is far less`magical' in its presuppositions than expected utility theory's. For it consistently adopts the third-person perspective of the political scientist rather than attributing special statistics-defying powers to rational decision makers. This, rather than causation, is the core difference between the two approaches.
Pragmatically speaking, however, the key consideration is that conditional expected utility theory promises to explain turnout in mass elections when such behavior is relatively anonymous and participation is not determined by powerful mobilizing groups. Indeed while acknowledging the impact of costs and selective incentives, it also captures the sense in which the explanation of individual decisions has an important contextual component involving not organized groups so much as statistically relevant groups. Put in very broad terms, this analysis recognizes the potential signi®cance of the fact that individuals are not isolated but live in a society involving a multitude of complex social interactions and distinctive behavioral patterns, all of which generate important statistical dependencies in behavior. The analysis introduces this consideration into the study of turnout without invoking anything like the concept of civic duty which, to borrow Bertrand Russell's phrase, has all the advantages of theft over honest toil.
APPENDIX
This section offers a more formal characterization of the difference between Aumann and Brandenburger's (1995) approach to game theory and an approach rooted in conditional expected utility theory.
Consider a ®nite n-person non-cooperative game G in strategic form, with each player i 1; F F F ; n having available a set of strategies S i yielding a utility payoff u i (s) for each pure strategy n-tuple s P S X i S i . There is a set of all possible 158 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(2)
